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The Northeast region of China has been used as a testing ground for the creation 
of a functioning wholesale electric power market. We describe the profile of generation 
assets throughout the region and the ownership of plants. We calculate the 4-firm 
Concentration Ratio (CR4) and the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI). The current 
ownership structure exhibits modest concentration. We also describe the ownership 
structure of those plants participating in the trial operation of the Northeast China 
Regional Electricity Market. Ownership of this subset of plants is much more 
concentrated. Arguably, this is a troublesome obstacle to instituting some form of 
competitive bidding in the wholesale power market, and this may be one factor in the 
poor outcome of the trial operation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid-1980s, the Chinese electricity industry has been undergoing a slow, 
but thorough reform and institutional transformation.1 In 1985, the central government’s 
monopoly on the development and ownership of generation was ended, so that various 
local governments, state-owned enterprises and even private investors—including foreign 
companies—could develop and own generating facilities. In 1997, the massive 
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transmission and generation assets still held by the Ministry of Electric Power were 
removed from its control and put into a corporate structure, the State Power Corporation, 
with the objective of encouraging business style governance and management. A parallel 
corporate restructuring occurred for generation assets controlled by provincial and local 
government authorities.  
In 2002, the State Power Corporation of China, which owned 90% of the nation’s 
transmission assets and 46% of the nation’s generation assets, was broken up. Two major 
transmission companies were organized on a geographic basis, with the State Grid 
Corporation of China and its regional and provincial subsidiaries running the system in 
the north, central and eastern regions, and the China Southern Power Grid Corporation 
and its regional and provincial subsidiaries running the system in 5 provinces in the 
south. The major generation assets were divided up to form 5 large ‘gencos’ operating 
across regions: the Huaneng Group, the Datang Corporation, the Huadian Corporation, 
the Guodian Corporation and the China Power Investment Corporation. The State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission was created to oversee the industry, although the 
National Development and Reform Commission was tasked with managing the industry’s 
contribution to the national economic goals and so remains involved with key strategic 
decisions about the industry’s structure, including price policies.  
In 2003, the government outlined its goal of developing regional wholesale power 
markets and the efficient exchange of power between regions (see State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission of China, 2003a). This was preceded by a set of small 
experiments with competitive bidding for power in 5 provinces and 1 city.  The provinces 
of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang together conducted one experiment, while the 
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provinces of Zhejiang and Shandong and the city of Shanghai each conducted separate 
experiments. These covered a very small portion of capacity in each territory, began with 
only simulated bidding in mid-2000, and were quickly suspended in 2001 when 
economic growth created power shortages everywhere. In restarting the push towards 
markets for power, the Northeast region was selected to pioneer the effort. Simulated 
bidding was conducted in 2004, and trial operations began in 2005 and 2006. These trials 
had problems. Despite the significant publicity around the creation of this and other 
regional markets, it is not clear whether the trials will be followed up with actual 
implementation and whether these markets will soon take any meaningful role in 
matching supply and demand in any region.  
One key question is whether the ownership of the generation assets in the 
Northeast region is sufficiently competitive to support market bidding for wholesale 
power—see Sun et al. (2003). Our paper addresses this issue. We describe the ownership 
structure of the generation assets for the region as a whole and broken down by province. 
We also describe the ownership structure of the generation assets selected to participate 
in the trial operation of the Northeast China Regional Electricity Market in 2005 and 
2006. We calculate the 4-firm Concentration Ratio (CR4) and the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index (HHI). The current ownership structure exhibits modest concentration. Ownership 
of the subset of plants participating in the trial operation of the Regional Market is much 
more concentrated. Arguably, this is a troublesome obstacle to instituting some form of 
competitive bidding in the wholesale power market, and this may be one factor in the 
poor outcome of the trial operation. 
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2.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY IN NORTHEAST 
CHINA 
For electric power purposes, the Northeast region of China encompasses the three 
provinces otherwise considered China’s northeast region – Liaoning, Jilin and 
Heilongjiang – plus the eastern portion of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, 
encompassing the Chifeng, Tongliao, Hinggan and Hulun Buir areas of the Region. This 
region is shown in Figure 1. This is the transmission territory covered by the Northeast 
China Grid Company, Ltd., a subsidiary of the State Grid Corporation. The first three 
provinces lie directly northeast of Beijing running from the northern edge of the Yellow 
Sea and along the borders with North Korea and siberian Russia. At the southern tip of 
Liaoning is the major port of Dalian. Running directly northeast from there on a straight 
line are the three cities Shenyang, Changchun and Harbin, capitals of their respective 
provinces, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjian. On the western border of these three 
provinces is the eastern portion of Inner Mongolia. The full territory of Inner Mongolia 
has a wide east-west axis spanning much of the border with neighboring Mongolia and 
reaching north up to the border with siberian Russia. The eastern portion of Inner 
Mongolia that is incorporated in the Northeast grid starts north and east of Beijing and 
runs north from there. In the remainder of this paper we will refer to “four provinces” 
without qualification, understanding that the fourth is this eastern portion of the Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region.  
The Northeast region encompasses a territory of 1,249 thousand kilometers 
square, a population of 120 million, and a GDP of ¥2,109 billion (Yuan) or ¥17,600 per 
capita. The region generated 238 terawatt hours of electricity in 2006, consuming 236 of 
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them or 1,961 kwh per capita. Table 1 shows how these figures break down by province. 
Although Liaoning is the smallest province, it has the largest population and more than 
40% of the GDP and generation and more than 50% of the electricity consumption. 
Eastern Inner Mongolia, while the largest territory in the region—approximately equal to 
that of Heilongjiang—has the smallest population and the lowest GDP per capita. The per 
capita GDP of Liaoning is nearly twice that of the eastern Inner Mongolian province. The 
provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang appear very similar on a per capita basis, with 
Heilongjiang being slightly larger and more populous. The three provinces of Liaoning, 
Jilin and Heilongjiang all have a long history of investment in heavy industry, including 
iron and steel. Heilongjiang, in particular, has significant oil and coal deposits and relies 
as well on timber production. Liaoning has in recent years enjoyed the benefit of a 
growing chemical industry. The eastern portion of Inner Mongolia is more rural and 
agricultural, although Inner Mongolia as a whole also enjoys major coal deposits and 
some significant related heavy industry. In the years following China’s Reform and 
Opening, the Northeast Region did not enjoy the same level of growth as some other 
parts of China. However, in 2003 the country adopted a Northeast China Revitalization 
plan targeting economic growth there. 
The Northeast region was one of the few areas of China to be experiencing a 
surplus in generating capacity in recent years, and the transmission system was relatively 
good. It had relatively comparable retail tariffs in the three provinces of Liaoning, Jilin 
and Heilongjiang, as well as relatively comparable levels of economic development—see 
Zheng and Heller (2004), International Energy Agency (2006) and Yeoh and Rajaraman 
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(2004). These were important factors in the selection of the Northeast region to pioneer 
reforms and the development of a wholesale market. 
Across China, the grid and the dispatch of generation functioned largely on a 
provincial basis. There was little exchange of power across provinces even when one 
province had a surplus of power and another a shortage (see China Daily, 2004). This 
was due both to inadequate transmission lines as well as to the rules and incentives for 
dispatch. In the Northeast region there are often constraints in delivering power from the 
north to the south—from Heilongjiang into Jilin and from Jilin into Liaoning. One of the 
goals of the reform of the electricity industry is integration of the transmission grid across 
provincial boundaries by setting up regional grids which are intended to develop unified 
scheduling, management, accounting, and investment planning (see State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission of China, 2003b). The Northeast China Grid is organized in 
three components: the South Grid, consisting of the province of Liaoning and the area of 
Chifeng in Inner Mongolia, the Central Grid, consisting of the province of Jilin and the 
areas of Tongliao and Hinggan in Inner Mongolia, and the North Grid, consisting of the 
province of Heilongjiang and the area of Hulun Buir in Inner Mongolia. 
We focus our attention on the ownership structure of the generation assets in the 
region. We began with a 2007 publication of the Development and Planning Department 
of the State Grid Corporation of China, the Comprehensive Statistical Data and 
Materials 2006.2 Underlying this document is a complete listing of power plants in the 
region, their capacity, generation, fuel type, ownership and other information. However, 
this detail is not all publicly available. The document reports summary information along 
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a number of different dimensions. It also individually lists installations with a capacity of 
6 MW or more, showing their capacity and generation and location by province, but not 
the fuel type or ownership. Often the name of the plant makes the fuel type clear. 
Alternatively, we found the plant on the web and identified its fuel type or determined it 
from other information. For information on ownership of the individual installations, we 
turn first to a 2007 publication of the Northeast China Bureau of the State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission of China, the Annual Report on Electricity Regulation of 
Northeast China for 2006.3 Part 5 of this report lists the large thermal plants owned by 
each of the five major gencos. This corresponds to 34 installations with 17,151 MW of 
capacity, or 36% of our sample of plants with capacity greater than 6 MW. No other 
owners are listed individually. To determine the ownership of the remaining plants, we 
search the web using the plant name. In many cases we can find an owner for the plant: 
218 installations with 27,487 MW of capacity, or 58%. Where we cannot, we treat the 
plant as if it is independently owned: the remaining 126 installations with individual 
capacity above 6 MW, accounting for 2,841 MW in total or 6%. Failure to have identified 
the true owner of some plants will bias our results slightly towards a lower measure of 
concentration.4  
                                                 
3 The document is in Chinese and the original title is given in the list of references. 
 
4 In the remainder of this paper, we treat all plants as if they have a single owner. This is consistent with 
how the original sources handle the classification of ownership. However, this is not always the case. Some 
plants have multiple large shareholders, and in some cases power purchase contracts may alter exactly who 
controls the marketing of power from the plant. But the original sources have made an evaluation of who is 
the single controlling owner, and we have accepted that classification. We have not been able to deepen our 
database to have an accurate picture of the ultimate shareholder structure nor do we have information about 
contractual rights to the power. A more complete picture of this information could potentially alter our 
assessment of the measure of concentration. But attention to the ultimate shareholder structure would also 
have to address the problem that the state possesses a controlling stake in all five major gencos, as well as 
the State Grid Corporation, so that some decision has to be made about whether management decisions are 
being made independently at each company. This same judgment would have to be extended to treatment 
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Using this data we provide some simple descriptive statistics about the generation 
assets in the Northeast region, and then we turn to an analysis of ownership 
concentration. All of the statistics reported appear in Table 2. 
The Northeast region has a total of 47,880 MW of generation capacity produced 
in 578 installations.5 The regional breakdown of the capacity is 38% in Liaoning, 23% in 
Jilin, 28% in Heilongjiang, and 10% in eastern Inner Mongolia.  
The average capacity of an installation is 83 MW, but the distribution of 
installation sizes is very skewed. There are 11 installations with a capacity of greater than 
1,000 MW, although an installation can consist of several units. These large installations 
represent 31% of capacity in the region. There are 18 installations with a capacity 
between 1,000 and 500 MW, representing 26% of capacity. Another 58 installations have 
a capacity between 500 and 100 MW, representing 28% of capacity. There are 491 
installations with a capacity less than 100 MW, a good many of which are smaller than 6 
MW. These 491 small installations provide 15% of capacity. Table 2 shows this profile 
for the region as a whole and for the four provinces, individually. The only notable 
provincial distinctions are that Jilin has a smaller fraction of installations greater than 
1,000 MW, while eastern Inner Mongolia has fully 50% of its capacity in such very large 
installations and a much smaller share of capacity, in small installations of less than 100 
MW—7% for eastern Inner Mongolia versus 15% for the region as a whole. 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the plants controlled by various provincial governments or by other state owned corporations. In our 
analysis we treat all of these different state owned entities as if they were managed entirely independent of 
one another.  
 
 
5 The document shows 582 installations. We identify two listed installations that show zero generation 
capacity and which we assume are under construction. The remaining discrepancy of two is, we believe, 
due to double counting within the original document. 
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Fully 85% of the Megawatt capacity is thermal power. These are overwhelmingly 
coal-fired units, although the documents do not provide a further breakdown between 
coal, oil and gas fired thermal plants. Most of the remaining capacity, 13%, is hydro 
power, and 2% of capacity is wind power. There are currently no nuclear plants in the 
Northeast region, although construction began in 2007 on a plant in Liaoning province 
which is scheduled to come on line in 2012. Table 2 shows this profile for the region as a 
whole and for the four provinces, individually. Liaoning and Heilongjiang are even more 
dependent on thermal installations, while in Jilin fully 35% of capacity is hydropower. 
Some 15% of the capacity is in installations built for self-generation, so that only 
the remaining 85% is sold.  The portion of capacity used for self-generation is as low as 
10% in eastern Inner Mongolia and rises to 21% in Heilongjiang. 
Much of the capacity is in units providing combined heat and power. Of the 378 
plants with capacity greater than 6 MW, 200 of them are listed as units with at least 
some, if not all, capacity for heating. The total MW dedicated to heating is 18,424 MW of 
47,478 MW, or 33%. 
Five of the six largest capacity owners are the gencos assigned the generation 
assets of the former State Power Corporation in 2002. The other large capacity owner is 
the State Grid Corporation that was also assigned some of these generation assets. As 
shown in Table 2, the Datang Corporation has 9% of the assets, the Guodian Corporation 
has another 9%, the Huadian Corporation has 14%, the Huaneng Corporation has 11%, 
and the China Power Investment Corporation has 12%. The State Grid Corporation has 
13% of the assets, consisting 75% of hydro power and 25% of one large thermal station 
in eastern Inner Mongolia.  The remaining 33% of capacity is divided among other 
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companies. There are only 2 companies outside of the 5 gencos and the State Grid 
Corporation that owns more than 2% of capacity. One is Guohua Electric Power 
Corporation, 3.4% of capacity, and the other is Jinzhou Eastern Power Corporation, 2.5% 
of the capacity. Both are in Liaoning Province. Table 2 also shows this ownership 
breakdown by province. There are some marked differences with the regional profile, 
since certain gencos are absent from certain provinces and have a very large presence in 
other provinces. Liaoning is notable for the large percentage of power not owned by the 5 
gencos nor by the State Grid—fully 53%. Jilin and eastern Inner Mongolia have the most 
capacity in the hands of these 6 corporations, 86% and 87%, respectively. In Jilin, with 
its large hydropower resources, the State Grid has 31% of the capacity. The State Grid 
also has 30% of the capacity in eastern Inner Mongolian due to the one very large thermal 
installation it owns which is Yuanbaoshan. 
Table 3 shows the 4 firm Concentration Ratio and the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index calculated for the Northeast Region as a whole. The CR4 is 50% while the HHI is 
770, indicating a low level of concentration for the region as a whole.6 Table 3 also 
shows the CR4 and HHI when calculated excluding self-generation, since arguably these 
units would be less readily incorporated into a competitive market. Excluding self-
generation moves the region-wide HHI from 770 to 1,035, i.e., from below the 1,000 
cutoff level to just above it and so into the ‘moderately concentrated’ range. 
                                                 
6 The commonly used benchmarks for the HHI are: (i) an HHI below 1,000 is a low level of concentration, 
(ii) an HHI above 1,000 and below 1,800 is a moderate level of concentration, and (iii) an HHI above 1,800 
is a high level of concentration. These benchmarks are derived from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. 
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Table 3 also shows the provincial breakdown of these measures of market 
concentration. This is important insofar as transmission constraints create pockets of 
generation with greater market power. In three of the four provinces, the HHI is greater 
than 1800, indicating a high level of concentration. Only in the province of Liaoning is 
the HHI below 1000, indicating a low level of concentration. Removing units employed 
for self-generation does not change the picture with respect to these cutoffs, although it 
does noticeably raise the measures of concentration in the three provinces of Jilin, 
Heilongjiang and eastern Inner Mongolia. 
It may be instructive to compare these concentration measures in the Northeast 
China Regional Electricity Market with measures for other electricity markets around the 
world. Several of the independent system operators in the US have a market monitor who 
calculates and reports these figures for their systems.7 ISO-New England runs the system 
covering the six New England states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut. It reports an HHI of 700. The New York 
System Operator reports an HHI for the three regions of the system: the HHI for Upstate 
New York was 1,028, for New York City the HHI was 1,843 and for Long Island the 
HHI was 6,317. The high level of concentration in the two latter regions justifies extra 
measures to prevent exploitation of market power there. The largest of the ISOs is PJM, 
which covers New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and West Virginia, much of 
Pennsylvania Virginia and Ohio, and parts of North Carolina, Indiana, Michigan and 
                                                 
7 ISO New England Inc. (2007), New York State Department of Public Service (2006), PJM 
Interconnection (2007) and Independent Market Monitor for the Midwest ISO (2007). 
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Illinois. They report an HHI of 1,256 which is moderately concentrated.8 The Midwest 
ISO, which covers the remaining portions of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Illinois, plus 
Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota and parts of Missouri, South 
Dakota and Montana, as well as the Canadian province of Manitoba, reports an overall 
HHI of 567, and breaks this down by 4 sub-territories with HHIs ranging from 1,529 up 
to 2,813.  
In Europe, measures of concentration are typically calculated for markets 
organized according to national boundaries. A recent report by Matthes, Grashof and 
Gores (2007) shows diverse situations.9 In the England and Wales the HHI had fallen to 
616 by 2005, a level markedly below 1,000. In Scandinavia, the level is 974. In Portugal 
and Spain the level is 1,271. Taking France together with Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg yields an HHI above 4,513 which is obviously a very high level of 
concentration. In Germany, the HHI of 1,374 is in the moderately concentrated region. In 
Italy together with Austria and Switzerland, the HHI is 1,024. Interestingly, the report 
examines the possible creation of a market across national boundaries, encompassing all 
                                                 
8 Caution and care need to be exercised in comparing these HHIs across different countries or reporting 
territories. As always, the proper calculation of the HHI most crucially depends on a proper identification 
of the market. In our calculations, we have measured the HHI based on generation capacity and have 
included all generators within a given region. However, we also made the additional calculation excluding 
self-generation. The PJM figure is based on energy figures, not simply capacity, and in this sense is not 
directly comparable. PJM also further refines its figures by calculating an HHI according to the segment of 
supply provided, be it base load, intermediate, or peaking plants. The intermediate and the peak load 
segments of the supply curve are markedly more concentrated, with HHIs of 2,664 and 4,157, respectively, 
on average. The ISO NE figure, however, is based on generating capacity. But our figures for capacity in 
the Northeast China Region may more liberally include units that were not actually available, while the ISO 
NE figure is based on units made available for generation. 
 
9 This report highlights another area of caution for analysis of the HHIs across different countries since it 
takes care to incorporate additional information about control of a plant exercised through contractual 
arrangement and not through direct ownership. As mentioned earlier, our analysis of ownership in China 
does not incorporate any additional measures of control through contract or other means. 
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of the continental countries listed above. They report an HHI of 1,410 for this theoretical 
region-wide market. 
3.  TRIAL OPERATION OF THE NORTHEAST CHINA REGIONAL 
ELECTRICITY MARKET 
Development of the system of regional grids and improved connections across 
regions is also seen as a step in the process leading to competitive wholesale power 
markets. One of the state gencos explained to investors: 
The long-term objective for the electricity pricing reform is to establish a 
standardized and transparent tariff setting mechanism, classifying the electricity 
prices into the on-grid price, the transmission price, the distribution price and the 
end-user retail price, and to allow the on-grid prices and retail prices to be 
determined through market competition. The transmission and distribution 
prices are to be regulated by the government. (Huaneng Power International, 
2005, p. 14) 
The Northeast and the East grid regions were to begin this process. The Northeast China 
Regional Electricity Market began simulated operation in January of 2004 and trial 
operation in 2005—see the International Energy Agency (2006). Trading in the Northeast 
Market is conducted on the Northeast Power Exchange located in Shenyang, the capital 
of Liaoning province. The simulated and 2005 trial operation of the Northeast China 
Regional Electricity Market involved the participation of 28 plants.10 Initially, a portion 
of each plant’s normal volume of generation was assigned to be bid into the market, and 
later all of each plant’s volume was assigned.11 Bidding was either for annual dispatch or 
                                                 
10 Some reports refer to more than 20 “companies” or more than 20 “generators”, perhaps suggesting a high 
level of competition. As we report shortly below, when the trial operation began in 2005, only 10 
companies owned the 28 plants. As a result of the withdrawal of certain plants as well as ownership 
changes, in 2006 only 8 companies owned the 26 plants participating in the trial operation. 
  
11 Here again, though the terminology can be tricky. Where a given installation has multiple generators, 
only certain units were assigned to the competitive market. 
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for monthly dispatch. The bidding would set an energy charge, with a separate capacity 
charge being set by other rules outside of the structures of the competitive market. 
In the Northeast region the trial operations were suspended in early 2006, 
resumed in March 2006, and suspended again. The bidding results in 2006 were not used 
for actual settlements and the future operation of the market is under review (see 
Huaneng Power International, 2007).  
In China’s East region market, simulated operation began in 2005 and a pair of 
trial operations occurred in 2006 which involved actual settlements. A market has also 
been created in the South region with simulated operation in 2006.  
We have found little public data about these various simulations or trial 
operations and little public discussion of what may be the nature and cause of any 
problems. We turn attention to the level of concentration in ownership of generation 
assets as one possible cause of the problems. 
When the trial operation of the Northeast China Regional Electricity Market was 
begun, a specific subset of the region’s power plants was selected to participate. The 
2007 publication of the Northeast China Bureau of the State Electricity Regulatory 
Commission of China, the Annual Report on Electricity Regulation of Northeast China 
for 2006, identifies for us which plants—indeed, which units of the plants—participated 
in the trial operation of the Northeast China Regional Electricity Market in 2006. For 
2005 we found in Han Shui (2005) and in Electricity Market Research Institute of North 
China Electric Power University (2005) a summary breakdown of the companies 
participating in the trial operation in 2005 and their capacities. But these two sources did 
not report on the individual plants and their capacities. However, through private 
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correspondence with the State Grid Corporation of China (2008) we received a listing of 
the participating plants, their owners and their capacities.  We use these sources to 
produce Tables 4 and 5 which list the plants participating in the trial operation in 2005 
and 2006, respectively, together with their capacity and their owner.12 
In 2005, the total capacity of participating plants was 21,486 Megawatts from 28 
different plants. The two largest owners of participating plants are Huadian with 25% of 
capacity and Huaneng with 23% of capacity. The CR4 and HHI for the 2005 trial 
operation of the Regional Market can be calculated from the data in Table 4 and are 
shown in Table 3: the CR4 is 70% and the HHI is 1,582, which is within the region 
normally labeled ‘moderately concentrated’. This is markedly higher than the HHI for the 
region’s total generating assets, even excluding self-generation. This contrast suggests 
there is potential for competition that was not taken advantage of in designing the trial 
market structure. 
In 2006, two of the plants had dropped out of the trial operation, so that the total 
capacity of participating plants was 20,260 Megawatts from 26 plants. Also, one of the 
previously independent plants, Hunjiang, becomes owned by CPIC, raising CPIC’s share 
                                                 
12 There are some minor discrepancies between sources.  
The Hunjiang plant is shown by some to be independent and by others to be owned by CPIC. Our internet 
search shows that CPIC took ownership in July 2005. We list it as independent for 2005 but owned by 
CPIC in 2006. 
The Annual Report states that participation was limited to thermal plants with individual unit capacity 
greater than 100 MW and excluding those used for combined heat and power or for self-generation. We can 
identify units meeting the criteria for participation in the trial that, nevertheless, were not included. 
Moreover, some of the units that did participate appear to be combined heat and power units. For example, 
the Mudanjiang No. 2 thermal station in Heilongjiang province is a participant, although 400 MW of 1,020 
MW is heating. Also in this category are the Qitaihe No. 1 and the Jiamusi thermal stations in Heilongjiang, 
and the Hunjiang and Huichun thermal stations in Jilin. Also, in certain cases, some of the units at a given 
plant were selected to participate, but not the other units. 
The Annual Report for 2006 shows Shuangliao as a single installation with a capacity of 1200 Megawatts, 
while the private correspondence for 2005 shows a Shuangliao Co. and a Shuangliao plant, each with 600 
Megawatts, and this is how we have listed it for both 2005 and 2006. Since either way the full 1200 
Megawatts is owned by Guodian this does not affect the calculation of HHI. 
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of the trial market to 14%. Otherwise the picture in 2006 is very similar to 2005. As 
shown in Table 3, the CR4 is 76% and the HHI is 1,759, just slightly below the 
benchmark for high concentration. 
Table 3 also shows the provincial breakdown of these measures of market 
concentration. The HHI is greater than 1800 in each of the provinces, indicating a high 
level of concentration. In Heilongjiang, the HHI is even greater than 4000. Given the 
problem with transmission constraints between provinces, there might be significant 
concentrations of market power in these provinces for participants in the trial operation. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
We analyze the concentration of ownership of generation assets in the Northeast 
region of China, a region that has been put on the forefront in the national plan for the 
creation of a wholesale electric power market. The government’s allocation of generation 
to the 5 gencos was crafted to limit the concentration of assets, and our results for the 
region as a whole show a low level of concentration in the Northeast. However, because 
transmission constraints between provinces are often binding, it may be important to look 
at concentration at the provincial level. Here we see that the generation assets are often 
much more concentrated, with the exception of the province of Liaoning where there is 
significant self-generation and many independent producers. In order to realize the full 
benefits of the ownership structure at the region-wide level, it would be necessary to 
invest in additional generation to relieve congestion between the provinces. Alternatively, 
efforts could be made to reduce ownership concentration at the provincial level or to 
mitigate the exercise of market power. This paper does not explore the effectiveness of 
these options. 
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The trial operation of the Northeast Regional Electricity Market in 2005 and 2006 
was conducted using only a subset of the region’s generating assets. This subset exhibits 
a much stronger level of ownership concentration than the region as a whole. Arguably, 
this is a troublesome obstacle to instituting some form of competitive bidding in the 
wholesale power market, and this may be one factor in the poor outcome of the trial 
operation.  
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Figure 1
Territory of the Northeast China Regional Electricity Market
Table 1
Provincial Breakdown of Key Regional Statistics, 2006
Territory Population GDP Electricity Generation Electricity Consumption
per capita per capita
(thous. km sq) (million) (billion Yuan) (Yuan) (Twh) (Twh) (kwh)
[a] [b] [c] [d] [e] [f] [g] [h] [I] [j] [k] [l]
[1] Northeast Region 1,249 120 2,109 17,600 238 236 1,961
[2] Liaoning 146 12% 43 36% 926 44% 21,700 101 42% 123 52% 2,876
[3] Jilin 187 15% 27 23% 425 20% 15,600 46 19% 41 18% 1,515
[4] Heilongjiang 454 36% 38 32% 622 29% 16,300 65 27% 60 25% 1,562
[5] E. Inner Mongolia 462 37% 12 10% 136 6% 11,400 27 11% 12 5% 986
Table 2
Profile of Generating Assets in the Northeast Region and by Province
Northeast Region Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang e. Inner Mongolia
Capacity, MW 47,881 18,338 11,131 13,425 4,987
percent of NE region 38% 23% 28% 10%
Size of Installations
> 1,000 MW 14,632 31% 6,600 36% 1,700 15% 3,820 28% 2,512 50%
500-1,000 MW 12,678 26% 2,685 15% 4,383 39% 4,810 36% 800 16%
100-500 MW 13,221 28% 5,907 32% 3,560 32% 2,441 18% 1,314 26%
< 100 MW 7,351 15% 3,147 17% 1,489 13% 2,354 18% 361 7%
Type of Generation
Thermal 40,606 85% 16,721 91% 7,039 63% 12,456 93% 4,390 88%
Hydro 6,402 13% 1,401 8% 3,872 35% 853 6% 276 6%
Wind 851 2% 207 1% 208 2% 115 1% 321 6%
Other 22 0% 9 0% 13 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Outlet
Sold 40,896 85% 15,418 84% 10,329 93% 10,664 79% 4,486 90%
Self-Generation 6,985 15% 2,920 16% 803 7% 2,761 21% 501 10%
Ownership
Datang 4,079 9% 0 0% 2,309 21% 1,600 12% 170 3%
Guodian 4,219 9% 1,050 6% 2,239 20% 930 7% 0 0%
Huadian 6,472 14% 1,200 7% 0 0% 5,272 39% 0 0%
Huaneng 5,231 11% 2,740 15% 249 2% 1,230 9% 1,012 20%
CPIC 5,981 12% 3,028 17% 1,300 12% 0 0% 1,653 33%
State Grid 6,083 13% 545 3% 3,428 31% 610 5% 1,500 30%
Other 15,816 33% 9,776 53% 1,606 14% 3,783 28% 652 13%
Trial Operation of Regional Market
CR4 HHI CR4 HHI CR4 HHI CR4 HHI
[a] [b] [c] [d] [e] [f] [g] [h]
[1] Northeast Region 50% 770 58% 1,035 70% 1,582 76% 1,759
[2] Liaoning 44% 580 51% 803 78% 1,905 90% 2,289
[3] Jilin 83% 1,925 89% 2,202 100% 3,194 100% 3,740
[4] Heilongjiang 67% 1,837 84% 2,850 100% 4,295 100% 4,292
[5] E. Inner Mongolia 87% 2,427 96% 2,952 100% 3,572 100% 3,572
2005 2006
Note: We have no ownership data for the 1% of MW capacity in plants below 6MW in size. In calculating the HHI we add zero to the HHI calculation for these plants. We 
also cannot match the self-generation capacity total with individual plants. To make this calculation, we assume that all of the self-generation is from units owned by 
companies other than the 5 gencos or the State Grid.
Table 3
Measures of Concentration in the Northeast Region
Excluding
All Facilities Self-Generation
Table 4
Participants in the Trial Operation of the Northeast China Regional Electricity Market in 2005
Capacity in MW Market Share
Owner Name Province Installation Company Installation Company
[a] [b] [c] [d] [e] [f] [g]
[1] Datang Changshan Jilin 400 2%
[2] Datang Huichun Jilin 200 1%
[3] Datang Qitaihe Heilongjiang 706 3%
[4] Datang Liangzihe Heilongjiang 100 0%
1,406 7%
[5] Guodian Shuangliao Co. Jilin 600 3%
[6] Guodian Shuangliao Plant Jilin 600 3%
[7] Guodian Shuangyashan Heilongjiang 820 4%
[8] Guodian Chaoyang Liaoning 400 2%
2,420 11%
[9] Huadian Fulaerji Heilongjiang 1,200 6%
[10] Huadian Jiamusi Heilongjiang 400 2%
[11] Huadian Harbin No. 3 Heilongjiang 1,600 7%
[12] Huadian Mudanjiang No. 2 Heilongjiang 1,020 5%
[13] Huadian Tieling Liaoning 1,200 6%
5,420 25%
[14] Huaneng Dalianwan Liaoning 1,400 7%
[15] Huaneng Yingkou Liaoning 640 3%
[16] Huaneng Dandong Liaoning 700 3%
[17] Huaneng Yimin Inner Mongolia 1,000 5%
[18] Huaneng Hegang Heilongjiang 600 3%
[19] Huaneng Xinhua Heilongjiang 400 2%
[20] Huaneng Changshan Huaneng Jilin 200 1%
4,940 23%
[21] CPIC Tongliao Inner Mongolia 800 4%
[22] CPIC Fuxin Liaoning 200 1%
[23] CPIC Qinghe Liaoning 1,200 6%
2,200 10%
[24] State Grid Yuanbaoshan Inner Mongolia 1,500 1,500 7% 7%
[25] Independent Hunjiang Jilin 400 400 2% 2%
[26] Independent Suizhong Liaoning 1,600 1,600 7% 7%
[27] Independent Nenggang Liaoning 400 400 2% 2%
[28] Independent Jinzhou Liaoning 1,200 1,200 6% 6%
Total 21,486 100%
Table 5
Participants in the Trial Operation of the Northeast China Regional Electricity Market in 2006
Capacity in MW Market Share
Owner Name Province Installation Company Installation Company
[a] [b] [c] [d] [e] [f] [g]
[1] Datang Changshan Jilin 405 2%
[2] Datang Huichun Jilin 200 1%
[3] Datang Qitaihe Heilongjiang 700 3%
[4] Datang Liangzihe Heilongjiang 100 0%
1,405 7%
[5] Guodian Shuangliao Co. Jilin 600 3%
[6] Guodian Shuangliao Plant Jilin 600 3%
[7] Guodian Shuangyashan Heilongjiang 830 4%
[8] Guodian Chaoyang Liaoning 400 2%
2,430 12%
[9] Huadian Fulaerji Heilongjiang 1,200 6%
[10] Huadian Jiamusi Heilongjiang 400 2%
[11] Huadian Harbin No. 3 Heilongjiang 1,600 8%
[12] Huadian Mudanjiang No. 2 Heilongjiang 1,020 5%
[13] Huadian Tieling Liaoning 1,200 6%
5,420 27%
[14] Huaneng Dalianwan Liaoning 1,400 7%
[15] Huaneng Yingkou Liaoning 600 3%
[16] Huaneng Dandong Liaoning 700 3%
[17] Huaneng Yimin Inner Mongolia 1,000 5%
[18] Huaneng Hegang Heilongjiang 600 3%
[19] Huaneng Xinhua Heilongjiang 400 2%
4,700 23%
[20] CPIC Hunjiang Jilin 605 3%
[21] CPIC Tongliao Inner Mongolia 800 4%
[22] CPIC Fuxin Liaoning 200 1%
[23] CPIC Qinghe Liaoning 1,200 6%
2,805 14%
[24] State Grid Yuanbaoshan Inner Mongolia 1,500 1,500 7% 7%
[25] Independent Suizhong Liaoning 1,600 1,600 8% 7%
[26] Independent Nenggang Liaoning 400 400 2% 2%
Total 20,260 100%
Note: There are some minor discrepancies in the capacities of plants reported for 2006 as compared against 2005, but as 
this makes no material difference to the results, we have not attempted to clarify the sources of these discrepancies.
